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ASSOCIATION FOR 
MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v. 
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.: 
PROGRESS BY PRINCIPLES 
 
EMILY J. BOLYARD* 
 
“Liberty is the only thing you cannot have 
unless you are willing to give it to others.” 
  – William Allen White 
 
As the world of biotechnology has raced ahead during the past century, 
accomplishing enormous feats in the name of science and medicine, patent 
law has grappled with achieving the correct balance between incentivizing 
such innovation on the one hand, and impeding further advancement on the 
other.1 It can be difficult to strike this balance when granting patents on 
claimed products and processes, and failing to do so has the ability to create 
a monopolistic, exclusive right over a basic tool of scientific or 
technological work, preempting others from further use and contribution to 
humanity’s progress.2   
 
Copyright © 2015 by Emily J. Bolyard. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A., 2012, 
University of Maryland–College Park. I would like to thank the Journal of Health Care Law and 
Policy staff for their thorough work and helpful critique along the road to publication. For their 
eternal wisdom, encouragement, and support in all of life’s endeavors, I would like to thank my 
grandparents, parents, sisters, and close friends. 
 1. Francis S. Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Director of the National Institutes of Health and former 
Director of the Human Genome Project at NIH, once posited in an interview that: “Patenting tends 
to get people’s juices flowing when you put the word “gene” and the word “patent” in the same 
sentence. And understandably so. This is stuff we’re carrying around—all of us—inside all of our 
cells. Should somebody be able to lay claim to it?” Transcript: Bob Abernethy’s Interview with 
Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the Human Genome Project at the National Institutes of Health, 
Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, PBS (June 16, 2000), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2000/06/16/transcript-bob-abernethys-interview-with-
dr-francis-collins-director-of-the-human-genome-project-at-the-national-institutes-of-
health/15204/.  
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
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In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the 
Supreme Court considered whether human genes are patentable under the 
Patent Act of 1952.3 Originally enacted in 1790, the Act allows patents to 
be granted on any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, barring a judicially created exception for laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.4 These three naturally 
occurring things are nonpatentable because they create the foundation of 
scientific and technological work.5 In Myriad, the Court unanimously held 
that isolated DNA is nonpatentable, since such DNA is naturally occurring 
phenomena under the exception, and merely isolating it is not sufficient to 
make it otherwise.6  However, the Court held that complimentary DNA 
(“cDNA”) is patentable, as it is not similarly naturally occurring.7   
The Court reached this conclusion by following precedent in a number 
of ways, most notably in its emphasis on, and analysis of, the principles 
behind both patent law’s protections and the law’s exception regarding 
patentable subject matter.8  In doing so, the Court accomplished precisely 
those principles’ objective: striking the balance of patent law’s double-
edged sword by promoting further scientific progress while also proscribing 
the improper restriction of science and technology’s basic tools.9  The 
correct decision in Myriad was a colossal win for science, public health, and 
personalized medicine, and it came at the cost of a mere slap on the wrist 
for the biotech industry.10 
 
I.    THE CASE 
 
During the early 1990s, teams of genetic researchers began the search 
for a human gene11 correlating with an increased risk of breast or ovarian 
cancer.12  A team of researchers determined that one such possible gene 
 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part IV.B. 
 11. A gene is a piece of DNA used by cells to create one or more specific proteins. See 
Edward R. Winstead, GNN’s Genome Glossary, GENOME NEWS NETWORK, 
http://www.genomenewsnetwork.org/resources/glossary/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (defining 
“gene”). 
 12. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
summ. j. granted for plaintiff, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, remanded sub nom by Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. 
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was located on human chromosome 17, and another team of researchers 
thereafter sequenced13 that precise gene, naming it BRCA1.14  The team 
that sequenced this gene subsequently formed Myriad Genetics, a for-profit 
corporation located in Salt Lake City, Utah.15  Myriad soon identified 
another gene similar to BRCA1, and named this second gene BRCA2.16  
Myriad sought and successfully obtained a number of patents on both the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 (“BRCA1/2”) genes, holding the patents through either 
ownership or exclusive license.17   
Every human being carries the BRCA1/2 genes, but each person’s 
individual gene sequences may differ.18 Any given gene is composed of a 
unique sequence of four nucleotides: A, T, C, and G.19 Although this 
combination is typically arranged in strings of hundreds or thousands of 
nucleotides that are considered “normal” for a particular gene, variations 
are common.20  Because the human body uses genes as the “blueprints” for 
producing proteins and other biological products required for good health, 
particular variations can significantly impact an individual’s well-being.21  
Specific variations or “mutations” in the BRCA1/2 genes’ sequences—
sequences where certain nucleotides have either been deleted or substituted 
with abnormal nucleotides—are correlated with an increased risk of breast 
and ovarian cancer, and may also correlate with other types of cancer.22 
Women with these mutations have a forty to eighty percent chance of 
developing breast cancer over the course of their lives.23 
Once a gene’s “normal” sequence has been identified, as Myriad did 
for BRCA1/2, genetic experts can examine any individual’s particular gene 
sequence and compare it to the normal sequence, which allows for a 
determination of whether or not the individual’s gene sequence is healthy.24  
In addition, scientists can create cDNA, which is a type of DNA molecule 
that contains only the protein-coding nucleotide segments of DNA, or 
 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) to 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 13. Sequencing is the process of determining the exact order of DNA nucleotides (A, T, C, 
and G) making up a particular piece of DNA. See Winstead, supra note 11 (defining “sequence” 
and “nucleotide”). 
 14. 669 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 15. Id. at 376, 377. 
 16. Id. at 378. 
 17. Id. at 377–78. 
 18. Id. at 378. 
 19. Id. at 377. 
 20. Id.   
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 377–78. 
 23. Id. at 378. 
 24. Id. at 377–78. 
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“exons.”25  In the late 1990s, a number of genetic clinicians began offering 
and conducting genetic testing services for individuals regarding 
BRCA1/2.26  Myriad quickly took the position that any BRCA1/2-related 
activity was an infringement on Myriad’s numerous patents on the genes, 
and sent either cease-and-desist letters or letters proposing very narrow 
licensing conditions to a number of laboratories and physicians engaging in 
the alleged infringing conduct.27  
The procedural history carrying this case to its most recent appearance 
before the Supreme Court is lengthy and complex.  The lawsuit was 
initiated when a number of advocacy groups,28 professional 
organizations,29 leaders of medical and research institutions,30 and 
individual women31 filed suit against the United States Patent and 
 
 25. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, remanded sub nom by 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) to 689 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 26. See 669 F. Supp. 2d at 377–79 (identifying a number of clinicians who were engaged in 
these services in the late 1990s following the initial discovery of BRCA1 in 1990). 
 27. Id. at 378–79. Among these laboratories were the University of Pennsylvania Genetic 
Diagnostic Laboratory and the Yale DNA Diagnostics Laboratory, which subsequently ceased 
offering BRCA1/2 testing. Id. 
 28. These organizations included Breast Cancer Action, a national organization working with 
researchers to support innovative approaches to breast cancer, and Boston Women’s Health Book 
Collective, a women’s health organization seeking to educate the public about genetic analysis. 
These organizations explained that they would be able to inform the public about alternatives to 
Myriad’s genetic testing services, and that their members would directly benefit, were the patents 
invalidated. Id. at 374–75. 
 29. These professional organizations included the Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, the 
American College of Medical Genetics, the American Society for Clinical Pathology, and the 
College of American Pathologists. These plaintiffs argued that their members—including 
geneticists, pathologists, and laboratory professionals—were ready, willing, and able to conduct 
further research and genetic testing regarding BRCA1/2, were the patents invalidated. Id. at 370–
71.    
 30. Among these individuals were: Drs. Haig Kazazian and Arupa Ganguly, co-Directors of 
the University of Pennsylvania Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory; Dr. Wendy Chung, Director of 
Clinical Genetics and Clinical Oncogenetics at Columbia University; Doctor Harry Ostrer, 
Director of the Human Genetics Program in the Department of Pediatrics at New York University; 
Dr. David Ledbetter, Director of the Division of Medical Genetics at Emory University School of 
Medicine; Dr. Stephen T. Warren, the William Patterson Timmie Professor of Human Genetics 
and Professor of Biochemistry and Professor of Pediatrics at Emory University; Ellen Matloff, 
Director of the Yale Cancer Genetic Counseling Program; and Ms. Elsa W. Reich, Professor of 
Pediatrics in the Human Genetics Program at NYU’s School of Medicine Department of 
Pediatrics. Id. at 372–74. These directors and professionals were responsible for genetic testing 
laboratories and related services at their respective institutions, and argued that they would 
conduct clinical testing of BRCA1/2 on their own instead of sending samples to Myriad, were the 
patents invalidated. Id.  
 31. These women were diagnosed with breast or ovarian cancer, or had a family history of the 
diseases (or both). Lisbeth Ceriani, Runi Limary, Genae Girard, Patrice Fortune, Vicky 
Thomason, and Kathleen Raker argued either that they could not afford Myriad’s costly BRCA 
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Trademark Office (“PTO”), Myriad, and the University of Utah Research 
Foundation32 (“UURF”), in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York on May 12, 2009.33  The plaintiffs (“AMP”) 
challenged the validity of fifteen claims contained in seven patents that the 
PTO had granted Myriad and UURF.34 These claims covered BRCA1/2 
themselves (both in isolated and cDNA form), certain mutations of those 
genes, and methods related to genetic testing services.35  AMP alleged that 
the patents were unlawful under § 101 of the Patent Act,36 Article I, section 
8, clause 8 of the Constitution,37 and the First38 and Fourteenth39 
Amendments, asserting that the patents covered products of nature, laws of 
nature or natural phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic human 
knowledge.40  AMP filed a motion for summary judgment, which was 
stayed pending the resolution of the defendants’ (“Myriad”) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, 
and failure to state a claim, which the district court denied on November 1, 
2009.41   
The district court granted AMP’s motion for summary judgment and 
declared the claims-in-suit invalid.42  The district court explained that, 
despite the fact that the patents were granted pursuant to the PTO’s formal 
policy of granting patents on DNA sequences so long as they were claimed 
in the form of “isolated and purified” DNA,43 the BRCA1/2 DNA was not 
sufficiently altered from its natural state (i.e., as it exists within the body) 
 
testing or that they could not obtain a second opinion in addition to Myriad’s, due to Myriad’s 
patent claims. Id. at 375–76. 
 32. The UURF is a not-for-profit corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah, and an owner or part-
owner of all of the patents being challenged. Id. at 376–77. 
 33. See id. at 365, 370–77 (identifying each of the plaintiffs and defendants). 
 34. Id. at 380. 
 35. Id. at 369; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185, 
211–14 & nn.25–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (identifying and describing each of the 15 claims in turn), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, remanded sub nom by Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) to 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 40. 669 F. Supp. 2d at 369–70. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable under the judicially created exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101. See infra Part II.B. 
 41. See 669 F. Supp. 2d at 365, 370 (dismissing defendants’ motions to dismiss). 
 42. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, remanded sub nom by 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) to 689 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 43. See id. at 185, 211 n.25 (describing this PTO practice). 
  
146 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 18:141 
for it to constitute patentable subject matter.44  Furthermore, the court found 
that the methods claims45 involving methods to compare DNA sequences 
were nonpatentable abstract mental processes.46  The district court thus 
agreed with AMP and concluded that both categories of the claims at 
hand—those covering the compositions of DNA and those covering the 
methods used to compare DNA in genetic testing—claimed nonpatentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.47  The court applied the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to AMP’s additional constitutional claims against 
the PTO, reasoning that the court was precluded from addressing those 
issues since AMP had received the relief sought in the complaint.48 
Myriad appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court’s 
decision.49 Addressing AMP’s challenges to both Myriad’s composition 
claims and its method claims in turn, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
isolated DNA, including BRCA 1/2 cDNA, as well as one of the methods 
claims, were patent eligible.50  First, the Federal Circuit explained that in 
addition to comporting with the long-held practices of the PTO, isolated 
DNA is patentable because it has a “markedly different chemical nature” 
from its native counterpart located in the human body.51  Next, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the lower court as to methods of comparing or 
analyzing DNA sequences, finding these claims to be nonpatentable 
 
 44. Id. at 185. 
 45. Method claims fall under the larger umbrella term of process claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 
100(b) (2012) (defining “process” when used in Title 35 of the United States Code as “mean[ing] 
process, art or method”). Process claims, including method claims, are to be distinguished from 
products claims. See, e.g., In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that 
the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences had “fail[ed] to recognize the distinction 
between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are tangible items, and a claim to a 
process, which consists of a series of acts or steps.”). One treatise on patents defines “Patentable 
Subject Matter” as “four categories of subject matter . . . . Three are structural (products): 
machines, manufacturers, compositions of matter; one is operational (process).” 1 DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, pt. 1, Glossary. 
 46. 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185. 
 47. Id. Included in the district court’s holding that the composition claims to isolated DNA 
were invalid were Myriad’s claims to BRCA1/2 cDNA. Id. at 230. The fact that the cDNA 
molecules contain only protein-coding exons was not sufficient to render the cDNA “markedly 
different” from its natural counterpart. Id. For further discussion on cDNA, see supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 48. 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38. 
 49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, remanded sub nom by Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1794 (2012) to 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013). 
 50. Id. at 1350, 1355, 1358. 
 51. Id. at 1354. 
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abstract mental processes.52 The Federal Circuit, however, distinguished 
Myriad’s claim to a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics from 
the other methods claims, finding the former method patent eligible 53 
After the Federal Circuit denied AMP’s petition for rehearing,54 the 
United States Supreme Court granted AMP’s writ of certiorari.55  The 
Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded the 
case to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision56 in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.57  On remand, the Federal Circuit decided the case 
exactly as it had before—the appellate court reversed the district court’s 
decision as to Myriad’s composition claims, holding that isolated DNA 
(including cDNA) was patent eligible, and affirmed the district court’s 
decision as to most of Myriad’s methods claims, holding that techniques for 
comparing or analyzing DNA were not patent eligible.58  Lastly, the 
Federal Circuit again held that Myriad’s particular method claim regarding 
 
 52. Id. at 1355, 135; see also supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (indicating the 
district court’s decision). 
 53. 653 F.3d at 1357–58. 
 54. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, No. 2010-1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21143, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2011) (mem.). 
 55. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 182 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2012) (mem.). 
 56. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). For further discussion on Mayo, see infra Part II.B. 
 57. 182 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2012). 
 58. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). It is worth noting that the Federal Circuit’s decision 
here was fragmented—although Judges Lourie, Moore, and Bryson all agreed as to the 
patentability of cDNA and the methods claims, the three judges reasoned differently regarding the 
patentability of isolated DNA. Judge Lourie, writing for the majority, found that isolated DNA is 
patent eligible because isolating DNA requires the severing of chemical bonds, a chemical 
alteration that creates a new molecule with a unique chemical composition sufficiently distinct 
from its naturally occurring equivalent. Id. at 1308, 1327–28. Judge Moore, concurring in part, 
wrote separately to explain her reasoning behind finding isolated DNA patentable. Id. at 1337 
(Moore, J., concurring in part). Judge Moore did not find that the severed chemical bonds, alone, 
were sufficient to direct the claims to human genes to patentable subject matter. Id. at 1341. 
Instead, she found the different and beneficial utility in the “truncat[ed]” DNA, in addition to the 
severed chemical bonds, to be the crucial factor rendering shorter DNA sequences patentable. Id. 
at 1341–42. Regarding longer strands of DNA, where most or all of the gene is encompassed in 
the claim, Judge Moore explained that the beneficial utility stemming from shorter DNA 
fragments is not similarly present. Id. at 1343. Instead, she found these claims were patentable due 
to Congress’s authorization of an expansive scope of patentable subject matter, and furthermore, 
due to the PTO’s longstanding practice of granting such patents and the reliance of patent holders. 
Id. Notably, she explained that she might have concluded that such isolated DNA segments are 
patent ineligible had she been deciding the case “on a blank canvas,” especially in light of Mayo. 
Id. Lastly, Judge Bryson—concurring in part and dissenting in part—found the isolated DNA to 
be patent ineligible. Id. at 1348 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He did not 
find the cleaving of covalent bonds sufficient to make the isolated DNA claims patentable; 
instead, he found that the functional portion of the DNA—the nucleotide sequence—remained  
identical to its naturally occurring counterpart, and thus the structural similarities between the two 
dwarfed the structural differences. Id. at 1355. 
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the screening of potential cancer therapeutics using changes in cell growth 
rates was patent eligible.59 
AMP appealed once again to the Supreme Court upon writ of 
certiorari, which the Court granted, certifying only the first question 
presented in the appellants’ petition: are human genes patentable?60 
 
II.    LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Ever since the passage of the Patent Act of 1790, both Congress and 
the judiciary have largely endorsed an expansive approach with regards to 
what constitutes patentable subject matter for purposes of patent 
protection.61  Part II.A of this Note describes the history of this liberal 
approach to patentable subject matter eligibility.62  Part II.B sets forth the 
Supreme Court’s long-held exception to this broad eligibility, and outlines 
the nuances in the Court’s reasoning.63  Part II.C explains the Supreme 
Court’s limited decisions interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the world of 
“products” claims.64  Lastly, Part II.D discusses the Court’s stance on its 
proper role in interpreting § 101 amid legislative and executive action, and 
describes such action as it pertains to DNA patents.65  
 
A.     Patent Law’s Generosity Regarding Subject Matter Eligibility 
 
Congress passed the first Patent Act in 1790, subsequently modifying 
the Act’s language in 1793, pursuant to its powers under the Progress 
Clause of the United States Constitution.66  Article 8, section 8, clause 8 of 
the Constitution grants Congress the authority to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”67  Purely a matter of federal law, patent law has a number of 
 
 59. See id. at 1309 (majority opinion) (reversing the district court’s decision that this method 
claim was directed to a patent-ineligible scientific principle). 
 60. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012) 
(mem.) (limiting grant of petition for writ of certiorari to the first issue presented); see also 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947, at *i. 
 61. See infra Part II.A. 
 62. See infra Part II.A. 
 63. See infra Part II.B. 
 64. See infra Part II.C. 
 65. See infra Part II.D. 
 66. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236, 3242–43 (2010) (describing the Act’s legislative 
history). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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both formal (or procedural) and substantive requirements.68  Among these 
substantive requirements are: patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, and 
nonobviousness.69  Patentable subject matter, or those things that can be 
granted a patent, is now defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, a statutory provision 
that has remained virtually identical to that codified in 1793:  
 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.70 
 
The only change in this language to date is the substitution of 
“process” for “art”—a minor modification resulting from Congress’s 
passage of the Patent Act of 1952.71 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have interpreted this statutory 
provision governing patentable subject matter generously.72  In harmony 
with Thomas Jefferson’s philosophy behind the 1793 Act,73 that “ingenuity 
should receive a liberal encouragement,” Congress declared in its 
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act that patentable subject 
matter should “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”74  The 
Supreme Court has since reaffirmed this fundamental principle of patent 
 
 68. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 111 (2012) (requiring a claimed invention to meet the substantive 
requirement of non-obvious subject matter and the procedural requirement of a written application 
in order to be granted a patent). 
 69. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103; see also Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric 
Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 388–89 (2011) 
(“On a daily basis, the PTO must make difficult substantive patent law decisions on issues—such 
as the patentability of subject matter and standards for nonobviousness . . . .”). 
 70. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Compare id., with The Patent Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 
Stat. 318, 318–21 (“Be it enacted . . . [t]hat when any person or persons . . . shall allege that he or 
they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement [thereof], not known or used before the application . . . and praying 
that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to 
cause letters patent to be made out . . . .”). 
 71. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (explaining that the 1952 Act 
replaced the word “art” with “process,” but “otherwise left [the existing] language intact”). 
 72. See, e.g., id. (according a “broad construction” of § 101 after finding that Congress meant 
for the patent laws to be given wide scope as demonstrated by Congress’s choice of statutory 
language and the provision’s legislative history). 
 73. Thomas Jefferson authored the 1793 Act, so his philosophy is inherently tied to the Act. 
Id. at 308. 
 74. Id. at 308–09 (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952); 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed., 1871)). 
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law in its decisions concerning § 101 eligibility.75  Illustratively, the Court 
has explained that the four categories of potentially patentable subject 
matter—processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter—
are to be understood and interpreted broadly per their ordinary, everyday 
meanings.76  The Court has reiterated that it will not read limitations into § 
101 or otherwise narrow its reach where Congress has not first indicated 
such intentions.77 
 
B.    The Exception to § 101, and the Shift Towards a Thorough Principles-
Based Justification 
 
Although patentable subject matter eligibility is broad under § 101, 
there is a longstanding, judicially created, implicit exception to this general 
principle: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patent eligible.78  Mindfully, the Court has cautioned that the exception 
cannot be construed too widely given that all inventions use laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas to some degree; thus, too extensive of 
an exception could “eviscerate” patent law’s protection.79 Although the 
Court has altered its portrayal of the exception,80 and its choice of 
descriptive jargon has evolved,81 the articulated principles and policy 
motives behind the exception have remained steadfast, and the Court has 
 
 75. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (“Congress plainly contemplated 
that the patent laws would be given wide scope . . . .”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (explaining that the Court must be mindful 
of the 1952 “anything under the sun” Committee Reports). 
 76. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (explaining that Congress’s choice of the word “process” in 
the 1952 Act will be interpreted as its ordinary, contemporary sense, unless otherwise defined); 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (explaining that the statutory definition of “process” 
is broad). 
 77. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 145–46 (2001) (citing 
Chakrabarty in declining to limit the reach of § 101 where Congress has declined to do so); Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 182 (same); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (“We have . . . cautioned that courts should 
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). 
 78. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Compare id. (identifying the exception as solitary—“an important implicit exception”), 
with Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (explaining that precedent provides three 
specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent eligibility) (citations omitted). 
 81. Compare Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) 
(forbidding a patent on a law of nature, which encompassed “manifestations of laws of nature” or 
the “phenomena of nature”), with Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (explaining that 
phenomena of nature, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable), and 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (1980) (articulating the exception as comprising of laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas). 
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consistently applied this exception to both “process” and “products” claims 
under § 101.82 
Dating all the way back to the decisions of Le Roy v. Tatham83 and 
O’Reilly v. Morse,84 the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to refrain 
from granting patents on the use of natural properties and powers; doing so 
would not only give the patentee a monopoly on new discoveries in 
physical science involving those properties and powers, but would also 
stifle further progress by barring other inventors from using them, thus 
ultimately impeding the public’s ability to benefit from the patent system.85  
In Le Roy, the Court reversed the lower court’s grant of a patentee’s claim 
on the use of machinery whenever the machinery was used to form lead 
pipes under extreme pressure and heat.86 The Court explained that a 
patentable invention exists in the processes used to apply natural 
agencies—not in the discovery of the agencies itself.87 The Court further 
reasoned that patenting the effect or result of a process would be “against 
the avowed policy of the patent laws,” as creating a monopoly on a given 
result would discourage further invention in arts and manufactures.88 
In more modern cases, the Supreme Court identified the policy reasons 
behind the “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” 
exception, but did not discuss the purpose of the exception in as much depth 
as the Le Roy and Morse Courts. For example, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Innoculant Co., Diamond v. Diehr, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and 
Bilski v. Kappos, the Court explained that these three aforementioned 
“manifestations of nature” were nonpatentable because they were part of the 
“storehouse of knowledge of men,” which is “free to all and reserved 
exclusively to none.”89  In Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook, the 
 
 82. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67–68 (explaining that the principles stated in Funk Bros., 
which dealt with a “product” claim, apply equally to a “process” claim).   
 83. 55 U.S. 156 (1853). 
 84. 56 U.S. 62 (1854). 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 113 (invalidating Morse’s 8th claim involving the electro-magnetic 
telegraph, since his attempt to claim the exclusive right to every improvement of the technique of 
using electric currents to create letters or marks at a distance would (1) allow him to avail himself 
of all new discoveries using this technique, (2) “shut the door” on future inventors’ possibly less-
complicated and less-expensive inventions, and (3) bar the public’s ability to benefit). 
 86. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 176–77 (finding the lower court’s jury instruction erroneous). 
 87. Id. at 175. 
 88. Id. 
 89. This reasoning was first articulated in Funk Bros. in 1948, and then cited in the 
subsequent opinions. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) 
(citations omitted) (explaining that natural phenomena, such as the natural qualities of a bacteria, 
are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men, for they are manifestations of the laws of 
nature, free to all and reserved exclusively to none); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 
(2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The concepts covered by these 
exceptions are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men[,] free to all and reserved 
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Court reasoned that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas 
are nonpatentable because they are “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”90  Although the Court’s opinions in these modern 
cases hinted at policy reasons for the exception, the opinions did not 
provide a substantial explanation as to why these “basic tools” of science 
and technology—or man’s “storehouse of knowledge”—are nonpatentable, 
as the Le Roy and O’Reilly Courts did.91  The opinions in Funk Bros., 
Diehr, Chakrabarty, Bilski, Benson, and Flook did not explain why 
patenting such things are essentially against the “avowed policy” of patent 
law.92  This principles-based analysis, however, has not been so lacking in 
the Court’s most recent decisions. 
In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., the Supreme 
Court, in a unanimous opinion, articulated the reasoning behind its 
longstanding exception to § 101 much more profoundly than it had in its 
more recent decisions.93  In addition to quoting the recent cases’ 
expressions of the exception existing for “basic tools of scientific and 
technological work,” which are “free to all and reserved exclusively to 
none,” the Court further explained why it is undesirable to monopolize 
these tools.94 The Court used cases ranging from the age-old Morse to its 
recent 2010 Bilski decision, pulling language together from the array of 
opinions to bolster its assertion that “[t]he Court has repeatedly 
emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by 
improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”95  This assertion was 
afforded an entire subsection of the Court’s discussion, complete with law 
review and treatise support.96 The Court gave concrete examples of the 
types of scientific and medical developments that could be inhibited should 
 
exclusively to none.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (same); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (same). 
 90. The Court first used this reasoning in the 1972 Benson decision. See Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). The reasoning was used again in Flook in 1978. See Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (citation omitted). 
 91. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text for a description of the Le Roy and 
O’Reilly holdings. 
 92. Cf. note 88 and accompanying text (indicating how Le Roy did explain why such patents 
are against the policy underlying patent law). 
 93. The Court cited Benson for the proposition that “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work” are not patentable, but then further explained that “monopolization of those 
tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to 
promote it . . . . At the same time, upholding the patents would risk disproportionately tying up the 
use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries.”  
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012). 
 94. Id. at 1293 (quoting the language of the previous Funk, Chakrabarty, and Benson 
decisions before elaborating in its reasoning). 
 95. Id. at 1301. 
 96. Id. at 1301–02. 
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the claims at hand be deemed patentable.97  The Court concluded by 
endorsing a balancing approach to governing inventive activity via patent 
law by describing patent protection as a “two-edged sword,” able to both 
stimulate creation, invention, and discovery through the promise of 
exclusive rights, and impede future invention through that exact 
exclusivity.98 
Worth mentioning is a patentable subject matter case that reached the 
Supreme Court in 2006, which the Supreme Court ultimately did not review 
on the grounds that writ of certiorari had been improvidently granted.99  In 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., Justice Breyer—who 
authored the above-discussed Mayo opinion six years later—argued in 
dissent that the Court indeed had authority to address the question presented 
of whether the patented process claim at stake was invalid for improperly 
seeking to “claim a monopoly over a scientific relationship.”100  Describing 
the § 101 exception as a “principle find[ing] its roots in both English and 
American law,”101 Breyer explained that the exception’s justification was 
that “sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than 
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ [which is] the 
constitutional objective of patent . . . protection.”102  After a detailed 
portrayal of the apparent dangers in overprotection, Breyer encapsulated the 
exception as a reflection of the “basic judgment” that protection in such 
cases would too often severely impede the development of useful 
knowledge, despite the potential for some positive incentive effects.103 
 
 97. Id. at 1302. Furthermore, the Court relied heavily upon the concern of inhibiting future 
research in dismissing several additional arguments as to why Prometheus’s claim on a method for 
determining the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs was patent eligible. Id. at 1303–05. For 
example, the Court rejected the argument that 35 U.S.C. § 112, among other sections, can 
sufficiently screen out those patents that do not extend beyond a mere law of nature, since unlike § 
101, § 112 “does not focus on the possibility that a law of nature (or its equivalent) that meets [§ 
112’s conditions] will nonetheless create the kind of risk that underlies the law of nature 
exception, namely the risk that a patent on the law would significantly impede future innovation.” 
Id. at 1303–04. 
 98. Id. at 1305. 
 99. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (per 
curiam) (dismissing certiorari).  
 100. Id. at 125–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer found that the question presented was 
fully briefed and not too difficult to answer, and that a decision from “this generalist Court” could 
contribute to the debate as to whether the current patent system reflects the “careful balance” that 
the patent laws stand for. Id. at 126, 138. 
 101. Id. at 126 (citations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 126–27 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). 
 103. Id. at 127–28. It is worth noting that Breyer artfully intertwined previous cases’ various 
terminology of “basic tools of scientific and technological work,” “storehouse of knowledge,” and 
“manifestations of laws of nature” that are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Id. 
(citations omitted); see also supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. Breyer also explained that 
the three categories of nonpatentable subject matter are not easy to define, and that such abstract 
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C.     “Processes” Versus “Products” Under § 101, and Precedent’s 
Consistency Regarding “Products” Analysis 
 
The Court has indicated that it approaches patent claims under two 
separate lines of case law for matters of § 101 eligibility: the “processes” 
line of cases, and the “products” line of cases.104  This approach mirrors § 
101 itself, as “processes” case law understandably encompasses those 
claims falling under § 101’s “processes” category, and “products” case law 
encompasses claims falling under the remaining three categories: 
“machines,” “manufactures,” and “compositions of matter.”105  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty illustrates this divide 
in the case law. In Chakrabarty, the Court analyzed whether a patentee’s 
claimed microorganism fell under § 101’s “manufacture” or “composition 
of matter” categories in order to be deemed patentable subject matter.106  In 
its opinion, the Court compared the facts of Chakrabarty to those of only 
one other case, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co.,107 since Funk 
was clearly a “products” case.108   
In contrast with the plethora of process cases that it has reviewed, the 
Court has only considered two cases, Funk and Chakrabarty, wherein the 
issue was whether a product fell under one of § 101’s patent-eligible 
categories or instead under its three-item exception.109  In Funk, the Court 
considered the patent eligibility of a claim to a cultured mixture of root-
nodule bacteria, of interest being the patentee’s discovery of a mixture 
wherein multiple species of root-nodule bacteria did not inhibit each 
 
categories cannot easily be used to distinguish instances of likely beneficial, from likely harmful, 
protection. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 134. 
 104. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 
1298 (2012) (explaining that the cases most directly on point for analyzing the case at hand, 
concerning patent claims covering a medical diagnostic process, were Diehr and Flook, as they 
were two cases where the Court considered the patent eligibility of processes embodying natural 
laws); see also infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 105. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (limiting patentable subject matter to processes, machines, 
manufacturers, or compositions of matter). For further discussion of this differentiation, see supra 
note 45. 
 106. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). 
 107. Id. at 310. 
 108. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 109. All other cases that the Court has considered under the § 101 exception dealt with 
processes, rather than products. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010) 
(considering a process for hedging funds); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981) 
(determining whether a rubber-curing process was patentable subject matter under § 101); Parker 
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 588–90 (1978) (considering whether a method for updating alarm 
limits was a patentable process); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (analyzing whether 
a computer-related method claim was a “process” under § 101). 
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other.110  The Court held that the mixture was not patent eligible because 
the non-inhibitive qualities of the bacteria were qualities of the work of 
nature, similar to the qualities of metal or electricity.111  The Court 
explained that the discovery of phenomena of nature is nonpatentable; a 
patentable invention lies instead in the application of the “manifestation of 
the laws of nature” to a new and useful end.112  Aggregating non-inhibitive 
species of bacteria fell short of such an invention despite the obvious 
advantages of the mixture for commercial industry, since the advantage was 
in the “mere packaging” of the inoculants.113  Allowing a patent in such a 
case would mean patenting a now-disclosed “ancient secret of nature.”114 
The Court came out the other way regarding the patent eligibility of a 
product claim in Chakrabarty, but its analysis heavily mirrored Funk—
albeit with subtle differences. In Chakrabarty, the Court considered 
whether a microbiologist’s invention of a genetically engineered bacteria 
capable of breaking down crude oil was patentable subject matter under § 
101.115  Holding that the engineered bacteria “plainly qualifie[d] as 
patentable subject matter,” the Court explained that the invention was a 
nonnaturally occurring product of human ingenuity, rather than an unknown 
natural phenomena.116  Unlike in Funk, where the patentee had simply 
discovered a part of “nature’s handiwork,” the inventor in Chakrabarty had 
made a breakthrough of his own handiwork.117  The Chakrabarty Court 
thus remained consistent with Funk’s distinction between discoveries of 
natural phenomena and actual inventions, but introduced a new term of art 
to describe nonpatentable products: “products of nature.”118  The Court also 
 
 110. Funk, 333 U.S. at 130. Prior to petitioner’s patent claim, root-nodule bacteria had long 
been used to infect the roots of leguminous plants, allowing the plants to take nitrogen from the air 
and convert it into organic nitrogenous compounds. However, only certain species of root-nodule 
bacteria was able to infect certain groups of leguminous plants. Furthermore, it had long been 
understood that different species of the bacteria inhibited each other when mixed, causing a 
decrease in their efficiency. For this reason, prior to the patented claim at hand, inoculants 
containing only one species of root-nodule bacteria were manufactured and sold. The patentee 
discovered that certain strains of the bacteria did not create a mutually inhibitive effect, and 
created a mixed culture capable of inoculating multiple cross-inoculation groups of plants. Funk, 
333 U.S. at 128–30. 
 111. Id. at 130. 
 112. Id. (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853)). 
 113. Id. at 130–32. 
 114. Id. at 132. 
 115. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 116. Id. at 309–10.  Of note is that the capability to break down crude oil is possessed by no 
naturally occurring bacteria. Id. at 305, 311. 
 117. Id. at 310 (quoting Funk’s “handiwork of nature” expression).  
 118. Id. at 313 (explaining that the relevant distinction regarding patent eligibility is not 
between living and nonliving things, “but between products of nature . . . and human-made 
inventions”); see also supra 116–17 and accompanying text.  
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introduced a new description of what a nonnaturally occurring, product of 
human ingenuity resembles: a product “having a distinctive name, 
character, [and] use.”119  Unlike the bacterial concoction in Funk, the 
bacteria invention in Chakrabarty had markedly different characteristics 
than any found in nature.120  
 
D.     The Court will Interpret § 101 as is Without Formal Congressional 
Amendment 
 
The Supreme Court has reiterated that in the absence of formal 
congressional action regarding subject matter that the legislature wishes to 
exclude from § 101 eligibility, the Court will interpret § 101 broadly.121  In 
Chakrabarty, the petitioner argued that genetically modified organisms 
could not qualify as patentable subject matter because Congress had not 
explicitly authorized any such protection.122 The Court rejected this 
argument, explaining that although Congress, not the Court, must define 
patentability’s limits, it is “the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is” once Congress has spoken.123  The Court ruled that 
Congress’s enactments of the 1930 Plant Patent Act (“PPA”) and 1970 
Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”) only demonstrated the legislature’s 
wish to protect cultivated plants via patent law, and were not to be 
interpreted as a congressional desire to exclude other living things from 
general utility patents granted pursuant to § 101.124  Furthermore, the Court 
rejected the petitioner’s reliance on the Court’s previous brief warning to 
proceed with caution when expanding § 101 patentability to areas 
“unforeseen by Congress,” explaining that that statement did not announce 
a new principle that unforeseen areas are per se nonpatentable.125 
In J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l,126 the Court built upon 
its analysis in Chakrabarty regarding Congress’s passage of the Plant 
 
 119. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10 (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 
(1887)). 
 120. Id. at 310. 
 121. Id. at 318. 
 122. Id. at 314. 
 123. Id. at 315 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 124. Id. at 310–13. 
 125. Id. at 314–15 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978)). The Court explained 
that, consistent with case law, a statute is not to be confined to the legislators’ contemplations at 
the time of drafting, and that this is especially true in the field of patent law since denying 
protections to unanticipated inventions would undermine the law’s purpose. Id. at 315–16 
(citations omitted). 
 126. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
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Patent Act and Plant Variety Protection Act.127 In deciding whether 
Congress meant to remove plants from § 101’s patentable subject matter 
eligibility by enactment of the PPA and PVPA, the Court explained that the 
PTO had assigned § 101 utility patents for plants for sixteen years—issuing 
over 1,800 such patents—with no indication from Congress that those 
undertakings defied either the PPA or the PVPA.128  Ultimately holding 
that neither act limited the scope of § 101’s coverage as to plant patents, the 
Court explained that in addition to not only failing to pass legislation 
indicating disagreement with the PTO’s actions, Congress had already 
explicitly recognized the availability of utility patents for plants via a 
statutory amendment.129 
Regarding the specific subject matter of human DNA and genes, 
Congress has never passed legislation concerning its patentability under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.130  Congress did, however, pass the American Invents Act 
(“AIA”) in 2011,131 which touched on the topic of genetic testing.132  The 
AIA required the PTO to conduct a study on “effective ways to provide 
independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where gene patents 
and exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist.”133  A 
report and recommendations were due to the U.S. House of Representatives 
and Senate nine months from the bill’s enactment.134   
In contrast with the legislative branch’s relatively limited activity, the 
PTO has taken a great deal of action pertaining to DNA patents. Beginning 
in the 1980s and continuing since, the PTO has granted thousands of § 101 
patents claiming isolated human DNA, as well as tens of thousands of 
patents related to modified, non-native genes.135 This longstanding practice 
was formalized in the PTO’s 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines, which 
confirmed that both excised genes and cDNA are patent eligible as long as 
 
 127. Id. at 130–46. 
 128. Id. at 132, 144–45. 
 129. Id. at 145. 
 130. The Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007), was 
introduced but never became law, as it died in committee. This bill would have amended Title 35 
of the United States Code to prohibit the patenting of human genetic material. See Text of the 
Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr977/text (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (“This bill was 
introduced on February 9, 2007, in a previous session of Congress, but was not enacted.”). 
 131. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284–341. 
 132. § 27, 125 Stat. at 338. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013). These numbers have been estimated at 2,645 “isolated DNA” patents, and more than 
40,000 patents related to non-native, modified genes. Id. 
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they are sufficiently isolated and purified as to be different from their 
naturally occurring states.136 
 
III.     THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,137 
the United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
unanimously holding that a DNA segment is not patent eligible merely 
because it has been isolated from its natural state, but that cDNA is patent 
eligible because it is not naturally occurring.138  In so holding, the Court 
concluded that Myriad’s composition claims to the isolated BRCA1/2  
genes—claims to the genes themselves and the information they encode—
were not patent eligible, but that their cDNA claims were patentable; the 
Court did not analyze Myriad’s methods claims.139 
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Thomas began by explaining 
in rather thorough detail the science behind DNA, genes, and genetic 
sequencing.140  In a style that could be grasped by the average reader, 
Justice Thomas described how a single gene is encoded as DNA, how DNA 
is made of chains of four different nucleotides, how some DNA codes for 
proteins, how scientists are able to extract DNA from cells, and how experts 
are able to create synthetic DNA, or cDNA.141  He then explained how the 
study of genetics can lead to valuable medical breakthroughs by examining 
mutations of DNA sequences, and how Myriad accomplished just that by 
determining the location and sequence of the BRCA1/2 genes.142  Thomas’s 
scientific analysis concluded with a description of the nine composition 
claims at issue in the case: claims to the isolated DNA of each BRCA gene, 
claims to the cDNA sequences of those genes, and claims to the isolated 
 
 136. 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). These 
guidelines disagreed with commentators’ arguments that genes are nonpatentable discoveries, as 
opposed to patentable inventions, and alternatively that genes are nonpatentable products of 
nature. Id. The Guidelines relied upon a district court case and a case from the United States Court 
of Customs and Patent appeals to support its conclusion that isolated, natural compounds and 
compositions can be patentable—even without any further change—as long as they are purified. 
Id. 
 137. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 138. Id. at 2111. 
 139. Id. at 2119–20. 
 140. Id. at 2111–12. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2112–13. 
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DNA with any series of 15 nucleotides existing in either gene.143  Products 
claims were the only type of claim before the Court.144 
After describing the scientific background of the case, Justice Thomas 
shed light on the case’s procedural posture.145 Thomas first explained how 
the patents, if valid, would give Myriad the exclusive right to isolate 
BRCA1/2 as well as the right to create synthetic cDNA of those genes.146 
Thomas also noted that Myriad had secured a monopoly on BRCA1/2 
testing by sending cease-and-desist letters to, and filing patent infringement 
suits against, multiple laboratories.147  Next, Thomas explained the Federal 
Circuit’s holding and analysis of Myriad’s composition claims when 
hearing the case on remand.148  He articulated how the lower court’s three 
judges had differed in their conclusions and reasoning concerning isolated 
DNA, ultimately holding that the DNA was patent eligible under §101.149  
Thomas concluded his description of the lower court’s holding by 
emphasizing that although all three of the Federal Circuit judges had 
expressed different opinions regarding isolated DNA’s patentability, they 
had agreed that the claims relating to cDNA were patent eligible.150 
In deciding the case, the unanimous Court began by identifying the 
long-held exception to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101: 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.151  The Court 
highlighted the purpose behind the long-held exception, explaining how the 
exception’s existence prevents the “considerable danger that the grant of 
[such] patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit 
future innovation premised upon them.’”152  The exception was described 
as having limits, however, due to the “delicate balance between creating 
‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘impeding 
the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”153 
After explaining the purpose of § 101’s exception, the Court 
distinguished the facts of Myriad from those of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.154  
 
 143. Id. at 2113. 
 144. The Court declined to address any methods claims. Id. at 2119 (explicitly stating that no 
method claims were before the Court). 
 145. Id. at 2113–16. 
 146. Id. at 2113. 
 147. Id. at 2114. 
 148. Id. at 2114–15. 
 149. Id. (citations omitted). For further discussion of the three judges’ separate opinions, see 
supra note 58. 
 150. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2115 (citations omitted). 
 151. Id. at 2116 (citations omitted). 
 152. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301). 
 153. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1305) (alteration omitted). 
 154. Id. at 2116–17. 
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The Court then reasoned through Myriad’s four proposed arguments, 
finding that neither the novel discovery of the genes, nor the extensive 
research efforts required to locate the genes, nor the severing of natural 
chemical bonds, nor the PTO’s past practices of awarding gene patents, 
alone, were able to save Myriad’s composition claims.155  After disposing 
of Myriad’s various arguments, the Court distinguished cDNA from 
isolated DNA, declining to find cDNA as naturally occurring because a lab 
technician undeniably creates something new when he or she removes 
DNA’s non-coding segments.156  
The Supreme Court concluded by emphasizing what was not 
implicated by the decision: first, Myriad’s method claims were not at issue 
because they were found to be so “well understood, widely used, and fairly 
uniform” that any scientist in the field of genetic sequencing would likely 
have used a similar process; second, the case did not involve patents on 
novel applications of knowledge about the BRCA1/2 genes, which a number 
of Myriad’s unchallenged claims were limited to; and third, the Court did 
not consider the patentability of DNA where its naturally occurring 
nucleotide sequence had been altered, because the patentability of an altered 
genetic code posed a different issue.157 
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
concluded that he was sufficiently persuaded from studying the lower 
courts’ opinions and various expert briefs that isolated DNA is identical to 
its natural state of existence, and that cDNA is not similarly present in 
nature.158  His very short, separate opinion was offered to emphasize that he 
did not join in those portions of the Court’s opinion that delved into the 
details of “molecular biology,” since he could not affirm such details based 
upon his own knowledge or belief.159 
 
IV.     ANALYSIS 
 
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,160 
the Supreme Court unanimously held that a DNA segment cannot be 
patented merely because it has been isolated from its natural state, but that 
cDNA is patentable because it is not naturally occurring.161  The Court was 
correct when it followed precedent in multiple ways, most importantly in 
 
 155. Id. at 2117–18. 
 156. Id. at 2119.  
 157. Id. at 2119–20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. at 2120 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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 160. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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reinforcing the Mayo Court’s recent, more thorough enunciation of the 
principles behind patent law.162  Through the Court’s continued return to a 
more in-depth, principle-driven justification of patentable subject matter 
under § 101 and its exceptions, Myriad was legally sound.163 Moreover, 
Myriad manifested as good public policy in properly balancing the interests 
of all parties involved.164 
 
A.     Following Precedent, the Court Clarified the Proper Analysis 
Regarding “Products” Under § 101, and Emphasized the Fundamental 
Principles Behind Patent Law 
 
The Court followed precedent in a number of ways when considering 
the merits of the case at hand, and in doing so, clarified for the PTO and the 
lower courts what the correct analysis is regarding products—namely 
compositions of matter—under § 101. First, the Court correctly followed its 
“products” line of cases under the longstanding products-processes 
divergence.165  Second, the Court properly declined to give the PTO’s 
past—and legally unsound—practices any deference.166 Third, the Court 
aptly utilized the recently articulated Mayo version of § 101’s exception 
when explaining the exception in the opening paragraphs of its opinion.167  
Lastly, the Court remained consistent with its recent focus on patent law’s 
principles by declaring the delicate balance behind § 101 and its exception 
as a well-established standard to be applied.168  
 
1.     The Court followed precedent when considering the patentability  
       of isolated DNA under § 101 
 
The Court followed precedent when analyzing the merits of the case, 
first by identifying Chakrabarty as “central to [the] inquiry” at hand.”169  
As previously discussed, the Court has only considered two cases when 
interpreting § 101 and its exception in the context of products claims: 
Chakrabarty and Funk.170  In Myriad, the Court used only these two cases 
 
 162. See infra Part IV.A. 
 163. See infra Part IV.A. 
 164. See infra Part IV.B. 
 165. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 166. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 167. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 168. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 169. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).  
 170. See supra notes 109–20 and accompanying text. 
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to distinguish and analogize the facts of the case at hand with precedent.171  
In addition, the Court remained in line with the major strands of analysis 
present in Chakrabarty and Funk, specifically Chakrabarty’s description of 
what a successful inventive product will look like, Chakrabarty’s “product 
of nature” language, and Funk’s discovery-invention distinction.172   
The Myriad Court distinguished the case at hand from Chakrabarty, 
explaining that unlike the microbiologist in Chakrabarty, Myriad did not 
create anything “with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature” with its claims on isolated DNA.173  Additionally, the Court utilized 
Funk’s discovery-invention distinction and found Myriad’s isolated DNA 
analogous to Funk’s bacterial mixture.174 The DNA therefore “fell squarely 
within the law of nature exception,” since a claim to a brilliant discovery of 
a natural thing—here, Myriad’s claim to the location of the BRCA1/2 
genes—cannot alone equate to a patentable invention.175  cDNA, on the 
other hand, was not found to be a naturally occurring “product of nature,” 
since an exons-only molecule created by a lab technician “is distinct from 
the DNA from which it was derived.”176  This part of the Court’s holding 
was entirely consistent with the Chakrabarty Court’s reasoning.177 
In addition to being analytically correct, the Court’s heavy reliance on 
Chakrabarty and Funk helped to remedy confusion among the PTO and the 
lower courts regarding the proper test to use when determining the 
patentability of compositions of matter. For example, in its 2001 Utility 
Examination Guidelines, the PTO explicitly declined to recognize Funk’s 
discovery-invention distinction, arguing that discoveries are patentable 
under the Constitution so long as other statutory requirements of Title 35 of 
the United States Code are met.178  Moreover, the PTO did not discuss the 
precedent established in Funk and Chakrabarty, both of which clearly 
instruct that mere discoveries of “phenomena of nature” are 
nonpatentable.179   
 
 171. 133 S. Ct. at 2116–17. The Federal Circuit likewise noted that Chakrabarty and Funk are 
the two cases setting out the primary framework for considering the patentability of compositions 
of matter such as isolated DNA. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 172. See supra notes 109–20 and accompanying text. 
 173. 133 S. Ct. at 2117 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 2119. 
 177. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 178. 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 136 at 1093–94.   
 179. See id. at 1092–99 (not once mentioning the term “phenomena of nature”); see also supra 
notes 104–20 and accompanying text. 
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In addition to the confusion over the patentability of “discoveries” 
under § 101, a strand of analysis has existed among the lower courts that is 
not present in Supreme Court precedent: the purification doctrine.180  This 
concept of “purified” compounds weaved its way into the PTO Guidelines 
as well, illustrated by the PTO’s statement that the discovery of a gene may 
be the basis for a patent, as long as “purifying steps” have separated the 
gene from its surrounding molecules.181 Consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, the Myriad decision did not use the terms “pure” or 
“purification.”182 Thus, the absence of such terms was legally sound and 
clarifying for the lower courts and the PTO.  
 
2.     The Court properly declined to give deference to the PTO’s  
         longstanding practice of granting patents on DNA-related claims 
 
The Court was correct when it refuted Myriad’s argument that the 
PTO’s past practices are entitled to deference under J.E.M. Ag. Supply.183  
In J.E.M., the Court acknowledged that the PTO had issued thousands of 
patents on plants under § 101, with no indication from Congress that such 
practices violated either the PPA or the PVPA.184  The J.E.M. Court, 
however, mentioned the PTO’s practices, not to give the PTO deference, 
but to illustrate Congress’s inaction as to any prohibition on the granting of 
plant patents under § 101.185  Furthermore, the J.E.M. Court noted that 
Congress had recognized the patentability of plants via a statutory 
amendment.186  The essential argument of J.E.M.—consistent with 
Chakrabarty—is that the Court will interpret § 101 as it is written, barring 
some formal, statutory amendment.187  The Myriad decision was utterly in 
line with this reasoning when the Court distinguished the case at hand from 
J.E.M., explaining that here, “Congress has not endorsed the views of the 
PTO in subsequent legislation.”188 
Unlike the formal congressional action at hand in J.E.M., Congress has 
never passed any statutory amendment recognizing the patentability of 
 
 180. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) 
(explaining that patents for only a degree of purity to an extracted product are not new 
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human genes.189  Rather, a bill was introduced—which later died in 
committee—to prohibit the patenting of human genetic material under Title 
35 of the United States Code.190  If anything, this kind of initiated 
congressional action plays in AMP’s favor.  Regardless, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that absent formal congressional action via a statutory 
amendment, the Court will interpret § 101 as it stands.191  The Court need 
not give the PTO deference, and this is especially so considering the PTO’s 
failure to correctly follow Supreme Court precedent regarding § 101 in the 
realm of DNA patents.192  Notably, the Court’s refusal to give the PTO 
deference in the case at hand substantially weakened the lower Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning.193 
 
3.     The Court remained consistent with precedent when articulating  
       the § 101 exception and when emphasizing the fundamental  
       principles behind it 
 
The Court followed precedent when articulating the § 101 exception 
and explaining the fundamental principles behind it. First, the Court 
identified the three-item exception as a solitary, implicit exception: “the 
rule against patents on naturally occurring things.”194 This articulation 
followed that which was expressed in Mayo, where the Court described the 
three-part laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas exception 
as one single exception instead of the plural “exceptions” expression of 
earlier cases.195  In addition to following Mayo’s diction, this slight 
alteration in phrasing may have had a beneficial refining effect, for the 
three-part exception has not gone without its fair share of criticism. 
For example, In Lab. Corp. of Amer. Holdings,196 Justice Breyer 
explained that the three categories listed in the implicit exception to § 101 
are not easily defined, and moreover cannot be easily used to distinguish 
instances of likely beneficial patent protection from instances that are likely 
harmful.197  Similarly, in Funk, Justice Frankfurter explained that terms 
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such as “the work of nature” and the “laws of nature” are vague and 
malleable terms, and that focusing on the discovery-invention distinction is 
a better approach to determining patentability.198  By remaining consistent 
with the Mayo Court’s approach to identifying the § 101 exception as a 
solitary exception, describing it as “[t]he rule against patents on naturally 
occurring things,” the Myriad Court condensed and simplified the exception 
to its essential premise.199  This approach complements the Court’s return 
to an emphasis on the fundamental principles driving the exception as the 
true standard itself.200 
In light of Mayo, the Myriad Court appropriately identified the delicate 
balance to be struck between incentivizing innovation and impeding the 
flow of information required for such innovation as the “well-established 
standard” to be applied in determining the patentability of Myriad’s 
claims.201  As previously discussed, the Mayo Court recently took the 
approach of explaining the reasoning behind the § 101 exception more 
profoundly than the Court had in previous cases over the last half-
century.202  In Mayo, the Court went a step further beyond the statements 
that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are nonpatentable 
because they are “tools of scientific and technological work” or part of the 
“storehouse of knowledge of men” and explained why these things are 
nonpatentable—specifically, they “tie up” the use of such tools and thus 
inhibit future innovation requiring them.203  The Mayo Court then 
concluded by endorsing a balancing approach when determining subject 
matter patentability.204 Mayo mirrored Justice Breyer’s earlier dissenting 
opinion in Lab. Corp.,205 but due to Lab. Corp.’s weak precedential 
authority, the Myriad Court was correct in relying solely on Mayo.206 
A common thread among cases dealing with § 101’s exception is the 
Court’s bar on claims that directly or indirectly preempt natural laws or 
phenomena after a determination that the inventor had attempted to 
preclude others from utilizing the laws or phenomena.207  The Federal 
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Circuit even found this standard to be Mayo’s rallying point in more ways 
than one: the majority opinion described Mayo as “provid[ing] valuable 
insights and illuminat[ing] broad, foundational principles” and found the 
Mayo opinion to be “focused on [the Court’s] concern that permitting 
patents on particular subject matter would prevent use by others” of the 
laws of nature at hand.208  The Mayo and now Myriad Courts’ focus on the 
fundamental principles justifying § 101’s exception—specifically, that 
naturally occurring things are nonpatentable because granting patents on 
such tools of science and technology would “tie up” the use of them and 
thus inhibit further invention—is not novel for the Court, but rather a return 
to the well-reasoned, more thorough analyses of early cases such as Le Roy 
and Morse.209  By paring down Mayo’s robust and thorough reasoning into 
an equally-principled, but more workable, explicit “standard,” 210 the 
Myriad Court has set an excellent foundation for future cases to come. 
 
B.     In Bolstering the Court’s Return to an Emphasis on Patent Law’s 
Fundamental Principles, the Court Achieved Balanced Public Policy 
 
By continuing the Supreme Court’s return to an approach that 
highlights the essential principles of patent law when deciding § 101 
patentable subject matter cases, the Myriad Court achieved exactly what 
patent law strives to attain. By proscribing patents on claims to isolated 
DNA but allowing patents on claims to cDNA and certain other related 
claims, the Court struck the balance between incentivizing further invention 
on the one hand, and impeding the flow of information required for further 
invention on the other.211  This healthy compromise manifested as a mere 
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slap on the wrist for the biotech industry, and an enormous win for science, 
public health, and medicine.212 
Although initial impressions regarding the effect of the Myriad 
decision on the biotech industry were conflicting,213 it has become clear 
that the repercussions of holding isolated DNA patent ineligible were not at 
all as dire as formerly predicted.214  Although Myriad’s stock price and the 
NASDAQ index for biotech companies immediately rose and then fell 
following the Supreme Court’s ruling, both have since returned to the levels 
that they were at before the ruling.215  Even Myriad itself hailed the 
decision as a “victory” in a press release immediately following the 
decision.216  Much of this is likely largely attributed to the fact that the real 
moneymakers in the realm of genetic research and testing are patents for 
claims related to synthetic DNA and method-related claims.217  In Myriad, 
the Court explicitly held that cDNA is patentable subject matter, and then 
deliberately took the initiative to spell out exactly what was not implicated 
by its decision.218  By “merely hold[ing] that genes and the information 
they encode are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because they have 
been isolated from the surrounding genetic material,” the Court left intact 
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Myriad’s patents on methods for screening cancer therapeutics, as well as a 
number of Myriad’s unchallenged claims.219 
In contrast to the mere hiccup for Myriad and the rest of biotech, the 
Myriad decision was a cause for celebration for science, public health, and 
personalized medicine.220  In holding that isolated DNA was nonpatentable 
subject matter, the Supreme Court threw out Myriad’s monopoly over 
BRCA1/2 testing services.221  Just hours after the decision was announced, 
companies began offering competing testing services for the BRCA1/2 
genes, some at just one-third of Myriad’s established price.222  This 
tremendously lowered price will allow a large number of patients who 
could not previously afford the testing to obtain preliminary tests, and could 
even allow patients to obtain subsequent testing for purposes of secondary 
opinions on diagnoses.223  Furthermore, now that the basic tool of science 
and technology—isolated DNA—cannot be the subject of a patent claim, 
“the doors of innovation” have been opened, allowing scientists and 
inventors to make further progress and discovery regarding DNA data.224  
Researchers will no longer have reason to complain about the “chilling 
effect” that the lack of this data has had on further advancement in the field 
of genetic sequencing.225 
 
V.     CONCLUSION 
 
In Myriad, the Supreme Court exalted the central principles of patent 
law, and did so by remaining entirely consistent with its established 
precedent.226  By remaining aligned with its recent return to approaching § 
101 cases with a complete analysis of the longstanding exception to 
patentable subject matter, the Court achieved the original purpose of patent 
protection—the Constitution’s decree to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”227  The Supreme Court successfully struck the balance to 
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patent law’s double-edged sword, and established sound public policy in 
doing so. 
